

## ***A. General Context of Rwanda***

This research represents a necessarily broad pursuit of the post-genocide development of Rwanda. This section seeks two different ends: first, to describe the themes that consistently emerged from the interviews; and second, to continue to pursue a description of the societal context from interview observations and discussion of human rights abuse allegations.

### **1. Ethnic Questions and General Context**

“Discrimination can bring destruction in one day” (Interviewee 4A, 8/16/06). The ethnic question is the basis for most of the issues emerging from Rwanda from the time of colonization to the present. In Rwanda, it is more accurate to think of these categories as having their basis in class rather than ethnicity. All of the three so-called ethnic groupings originally shared food, language, and religion, as stated above. They were also members of the same 18 clans, and present-day Rwandans can still tell you what clan they are from (Bawaya, 8/10/06).

The colonial influence was negative for Rwanda in many ways. The Belgians’ colonial propensity toward racism, as shown historically in the DRC, spread to Rwanda in significant ways. There was also manipulation of ethnic and national issues, as shown by their creation of the identity card system.

People who are interested in Rwanda invariably ask whether Hutus or Tutsis were met in the author’s work in Rwanda. This is an inappropriate question to ask in almost every social circumstance in the present Rwandan context. The author chose not to ask directly about a person’s ethnicity. This is hard to understand without viewing the context

in Rwanda from several different perspectives, and it is tied to the root of many of the conflicts that exist presently.<sup>1</sup>

Interviewee 5A (8/29/06) said that Rwanda “needs a history that accommodates everyone’s story . . . Hutu and Tutsi.” It is clear from the previous historical description of the genocide and events surrounding that time that the perspective of all people must be maintained and promoted by both the people in Rwanda and those outside the country. The present RPF government is attempting to unite these narratives through reconciliation, sensitization, and increasing and maintaining national security within Rwanda. The official title of the present administration, “the government of national unity,” also sums up its primary purpose. All of the decisions in this government attempt to contribute to these goals, though they have frequently been accused of the contrary. To this end, the government will not allow genocidal ideology: “Propagation of ethnic, regional, racial or discrimination of any other form of division is punishable by law” (The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 2000). Practically this also includes political, professional, and ecclesiastic division. A law to this effect has been written into the new constitution. Thus, when it comes to asking people about their ethnicity, one must be careful not to be divisive.

One example of such conformity is highlighted by the national Rwandan agency LIPRODHOR (The Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights), which was closed for a time.<sup>2</sup> This was the result of some of their members’ reporting that people in the agency had engaged in ethnically divisive activities, mainly through the

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<sup>1</sup> The value of interview narratives in a primarily oral culture is difficult for those from a literate culture to understand in many cases. For the speakers in these cultures their words may weigh as heavily as formally published and printed documents.

<sup>2</sup> LIPRODHOR is Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l’Homme

political arena. Some, such as Joseph Bideri (8/3/06), director of the Governmental Information Agency for Radio and Television, said that this whistle-blowing was a good thing; others, such as Amnesty International (2005, January 10), decried it as destruction of accountability in Rwandan society. LIPRODHOR reopened a few months later and now functions normally, though without any political involvement outside of normal voting as the Rwandan constitution allows.

Such mixtures of ethnicity and politics have even been engaged in by former president Bizimungu, who was impeached and eventually jailed<sup>3</sup> as a result of what he said to a French newspaper reporter, which described Rwandan and Burundian Armies as “100% Tutsis,” though 85% of the people in both of those countries are Hutu. He also said that if things continued this way, the Hutus would “kill . . . and chase out the Tutsis” (Thorn, [n.d.], No. 2112). It was construed as divisive ideology for an acting president to make this type of genocidal threat toward roughly 14% of his own constituency.

The Rwandan government wants to be seen as honest and pursuing the population’s best interests in every way. The French and the FDLR will do anything they can to sully that image. Bishop John Rucyahana said that “every time, France fights against Rwanda [in] April,” which is during their genocide remembrance week, a time of national mourning (8/26/06). The trust of the populace was shaken through their experiences with Habyarimana’s government’s anti-Tutsi propaganda machine. Such a lack of trust makes life very difficult for the average citizen and makes the present government’s challenge even greater as they try to rebuild the nation.

It has been a very difficult season for the Rwandan government as it has tried to assist people in reconciling. Because the land is so compact, many times the alleged

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<sup>3</sup> The former president was pardoned on April 5<sup>th</sup> 2007, (allafrica.com, retrieved 7/15/07)

participants in the genocide have to live next door to families whom they may have caused to suffer during the genocide. According to Andrew Rwigamba, the commissioner general for Rwanda, it is a plight even worse than that of the Jewish holocaust survivors: “People [in Rwanda] must live together . . . [the] Jews left Germany after the Holocaust . . . A solution must be found” (8/29/06). Justice and reconciliation will be discussed later in this section.

It is complicated to live with these tensions while considering how it affects actual families, especially when the ethnic line is rarely a black-or-white concept. One source said that few Rwandans could claim a “pure” ethnic descent. According to Elizabeth Neuffer (2001):

They [Neuffer’s interviewees whom she called “JJ” and “Anonciata”; they were from very different social backgrounds] considered themselves Rwandans first and foremost, and scoff at the idea of any real racial differences between them. Indeed contrary to what I believed, Hutu and Tutsi, by most anthropologists’ definitions are not different ethnic groups at all: they speak the same language, have the same religion, have intermarried, with as many as 25 percent of all Rwandans believed to have mixed ancestry. ‘I cannot say there are no Tutsi in my family, nor can any Hutu household. . . . [Anonciata said] No Hutu can say that they do not have Tutsi in them.’ (p. 86)

Regardless, the Belgian colonizers imposed the identity card system, which in many cases arbitrarily defined people as ethnically Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. They imposed guidelines of 85%, 14%, and 1% respectively to describe the number of individuals from the given ethnicities at any time.

One interviewee, Raymond Biseruka (7/31/06), came from the second marriage of a Hutu man to a Tutsi woman that functioned more like concubinage. When his father had taken a second wife, she was Tutsi, as most Hutu men saw Tutsis as more beautiful and exotic. Biseruka was given a Tutsi identity card, even though he was technically Hutu according to Rwandan tradition, in which ethnicity is passed through the father (thus *making* him a Hutu).<sup>4</sup> This identity card meant that he would never be able to pass exams that would allow him to move on to the next level of schooling. Children from such relationships have difficulty being accepted.

When circumstances started to become violent, Biseruka wanted to join the RPF, but this would have been a death warrant to those who saw him as a Tutsi. To offset these issues, Raymond's brother, who also had a Tutsi identity card, joined the *Interahamwe* in order to protect his family. If he had not done this, his family would have been in even more danger. His brother's name was announced on the radio as a Tutsi who was working toward the *Interahamwe*'s genocidal goals. Raymond's brother "had to kill to the maximum" in order to prove himself.

Biseruka had to dodge bullets twice and was only saved because a man was willing to house him against the *Interahamwe*'s wishes. Even after the genocide, the difficulties continued. Returning refugees asked him continually why he had survived, because his survival implied his participation in the slaughter. He talked about how inter-ethnic families were without unity "even under one roof," that parents did not know how to help the children figure things out. He says that God has given him favor to speak into these families.

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<sup>4</sup> i.e., if a person's mother is Hutu and father is Tutsi, he is Tutsi, and if his mother is Tutsi and father is Hutu, he is Hutu.

An interesting caveat to this story is Biseruka's recent marriage to a *Banyamelenge*—a Tutsi who lives in the DRC. He does not know of any other Tutsi who married someone who had a family member kill in the *Interahamwe*. He asked his future wife to tell her family about this. He wanted to give an opportunity for reconciliation before he was married.

A story is told all over the country to try to help the people understand how they need to respond to ethnic division. In Nyange in 1996, when there were still significant incursions into Rwanda by *Interahamwe* forces from the refugee camps in DRC, a group of secondary school girls were faced with the ubiquitous question “who are Hutus and who are Tutsis?” as a group of 150 *Interahamwe* entered their rooms at night (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 353). This question might have been asked at any time in the educational process under Habyarimana's reign, though with very different results. According to Leonard Bizimungu (8/22/06), a secondary school manager of the school in Nyange where these events occurred, these girls refused to separate into ethnic categories. They said simply, “We are Rwandan,” and as such, several were randomly executed and beaten.

According to many documents, the process of reconciling and realizing ethnicity in a non-divisive way will take a while. The sense of the author was that the country will be able to emerge out of the chaos of their past and become capable of dealing with their future as they can come together as one to face their challenges. All of these attempts to have the people become “Rwandan” as opposed to Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are in direct contrast to the previous government that masterminded the murder of an entire category of its own people in the name of ethno-nationalism.

## 2. Faith, Church, and Religion

The country of Rwanda experienced a crisis of faith as a result of the 1994 genocide. One of the major tenets of the Christian faith, the primary faith in Rwanda, is shown concisely in the Bible: “The entire law is summed up in a single command: Love your neighbor as yourself” (Galatians 5:14, NIV<sup>5</sup>). The genocidal actions the Rwandans committed in recent history are categorically opposed to this scripture and thus beg the question, what did it mean to be a Christian in Rwanda prior to the genocide?

Some important considerations: At the time of the genocide, 89.8% of the population claimed membership in “a Christian Church” (Rittner, Roth, and Whitworth, 2004, p. xi).<sup>6</sup> Statistically speaking, most of these were Catholic in their beliefs. One need not search very far to see examples of clergy in jail for genocidal charges (Neyt, Rittner, Roth, & Whitworth, 2004, p. 251). Paul Rusesabagina (2006), manager of *Hotel Des Mille Collines*, made famous by the film *Hotel Rwanda*, describes a unique connection between the lower-class Belgian Catholic priests sent to Christianize Rwanda and the lower-class Hutus during colonial times. He says the priests saw the Hutus as stigmatized and tried to help them all the more because they felt the same way (p. 25). Prunier (1995) says the Catholic Church afforded Hutus their only significant means of higher education during the colonial period: “To obtain any kind of post secondary education, the Hutu had no choice but to become theology students” (p. 33). He says further that “the Catholic Church had always solidly supported President Habyarimana. . . The Church’s game in Rwanda had always been clear: total support for the regime in exchange for a

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<sup>5</sup> Scripture taken from the HOLY BIBLE, NEW INTERNATIONAL VERSION®. Copyright © 1973, 1978, 1984 International Bible Society. Used by permission of Zondervan. All rights reserved.

<sup>6</sup> Rittner, Roth and Whitworth acquired this statistic from: Linden, I. (1999). *Christianisme et Pouvoirs au Rwanda*, Karthala 101-129.

rather open-minded ethnic policy and a free hand in social, educational, and even financial matters” (Prunier, 1995, p. 125). The initial converts to the faith were primarily those who were “poor” and “marginal,” who sought the patronage of the missionaries in an attempt to raise their social status (Prunier, 1995, p. 31).

After the genocide, when the *Interahamwe*/FAR were still attempting insurgent and destabilizing actions back into Rwanda from the Congo, they named these genocidal attacks after Biblical references:

...Alleluia, Amen, *Oracle du Seigneur* (Oracle of the Lord), *Trompête* (suggesting Joshua’s trumpet as he entered Jericho in the Old Testament), and *la Fronde* (evoking David’s defeat of Goliath with the deadly sling). These insinuations suggest the Christian God’s blessings, thus giving weight and credence to the négationisme of the continued genocide. It suggests that the Christian God is for the genocidal tendencies and the purification of Christian Rwanda from the Tutsi infidels who are also *inyenzi*. (Rusagara, 9/17/06)

How can the Church and other religious bodies become a part of the solution to Rwanda’s problems? According to Bishop John Rucyahana (8/26/06) of the Anglican Church, “[The genocide] led to an exposure of the nature of faith”; it also “shook the foundation of mission.” He said there has been a “rediscovery, a common vision . . . churches are working together now,” that the Church is “nurturing [the population of Rwanda] in Christ . . . converting their whole being [in a] transformational [way].” Clearly, as a member of the clergy, the bishop felt responsible to help the country heal as it moved forward from 1994. One interviewee told a story about a Hutu Anglican pastor

who went to a church in the north. When he arrived, the church was physically split along ethnic lines by seating sections in the sanctuary. This man set a chair equidistant between the two groupings (Interviewee 5A, 8/29/06). Many clergy feel this responsibility to bring solutions to the country.

Churches and church or faith-related organizations are seeking ways to bring reconciliation to the country in other ways. Bishop Rucyahana described an organization that helps people rebuild the houses of those who suffered from the genocide. A national organization called CARSA (Christian Action for Reconciliation and Social Assistance) brings *genocidaires* together with those whose families they have killed and helps them reconcile with one another. These were some of the most poignant interviews among the entire body of research and will be thoroughly described in the reconciliation section. In brief, they focus on confession and forgiveness and see not only the perpetrators as needing to confess, but also the victims who have had their families killed, often for hating those who have persecuted their families. They see this reciprocal forgiveness, along with continual dialogue between those involved, as the only way to find true reconciliation. It is clear that the church has a lot of ground to regain in Rwanda. It is also clear that they are attempting this with a concerted effort. This will be an area that is worth watching as it progresses.

### **3. External Context**

Rwanda must also be seen from the outside, as so many neighboring countries have experienced diplomatic fluctuations of late. These interests will be broken down into two different groupings of external context: Rwanda's African neighbors and those on the broader intercontinental stage.

## a) Rwanda's African Neighbors

Rwanda has contiguous borders with Burundi, Tanzania, DRC, and Uganda. It is small, only the size of the US state of New Hampshire, but it has made a significant political impact in the region. The country has been incredibly safe for the last few years, which has led to foreign investment and increased potential for growth within its own borders.

Since the RPF stopped the genocide, they have had significant interaction militarily in the DRC.<sup>7</sup> They helped Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the father of current president Joseph Kabila, get into office in an attempt to bring more stability to their respective countries. This was in response to the DRC's harboring the *Interahamwe*/FAR and Lord's Resistance Armies within its borders, bolstering these insurgent militias' military activities back into their countries of origin. This trend has continued to yield massive destabilization in the Great Lakes Region even into present history.

There is a significant difference between the perspective of people living in the DRC and those in Rwanda. Most of the people interviewed in the DRC had a very low opinion of Rwanda and its government. Rwanda's present government and Uganda have contributed some to the suffering during the recent wars in the DRC, but DRC has also had insecurity due to its own lack of governance and infrastructure, and its allowing militaries hostile to neighboring countries to take up residence within their borders and pursue military incursions from these locales.

Most of the interviewees in the DRC made little distinction between ethnic groups and labeled all insecurity in their region as resulting from "Rwandans." There was not a

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<sup>7</sup> A whole section will be dedicated to this cause later in this report.

distinction between political refugees, RPF military, Hutu, or Tutsi. For instance, it did not matter that some of the insurgents killing Tutsis in the Eastern DRC were *Interahamwe*/FAR, which were clearly unsanctioned by the present Rwandan government. The most important matter was simply that they were Rwandan. One of them said it was difficult to tell who of Rwandan nationality was a soldier (Mukasi, 8/25/06).

Another interviewee talked about frustration that DRC cannot develop as quickly as Rwanda has been. They said that Rwanda and DRC had a great relationship before the genocide, but that now they blame Rwanda for a lot of suffering. They are also upset that they have to use the Rwandan airport to import goods and services into the DRC from Europe and other parts of Africa. As the interview continued, there was a sense that the Congolese were asking why Rwandans prosper while they suffer (Group in Goma store, group interview, 8/25/06). One confidential source, who is a Congolese university student who helped as a translator during research in the DRC, said that Congolese who came as students into Rwanda would often start out cynical about Kagame and the RPF, but ended up agreeing with Rwandan politics in one or two years (Confidential, 8/25/06).

The last DRC interview was with Madame Odette Bwari (8/25/06), who was developing a church-based organization to bring reconciliation between Rwanda and the DRC. She said she was not sure why the hatred existed between the nations. She also mentioned, however, that the DRC government uses FDLR for their own purposes in protecting election polls and other military activities.

The loudest voices coming from the DRC seem primarily anti-Rwandan and anti-RPF. Many of them need to assuage their own guilt for the genocide, and they need

patrons<sup>8</sup> to help them achieve this goal. Many *genocidaires* also face justice if they return to Rwanda for crimes committed; however, Rwanda has reintegrated more than 40,000 adult troops, including officers, who were former *Interahamwe*/FAR, into their own national militia (Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, 2006). This continuing trend should lead to greater unity within the Rwandan military and the communities affected by it.

The other country that was safe enough for overland travel during the author's stay in Rwanda was Uganda. The interview conducted with a secondary school teacher, Anthony Musasizi (8/17/06), indicated the view that Rwanda had more "promise for life" than Uganda. He said that development was also moving much faster for Rwanda than for Uganda. He had the perception that there was less corruption in Rwanda than Uganda. This was shown by the inability to bribe the police force<sup>9</sup> and the amount of time and documentation required to acquire a Rwandan passport. He noted the increase of infrastructure in the country while emphasizing the needs of these improvements to impact rural as well as urban areas. He said that the Rwandan military was "strong" and "very serious."

The author was unable to visit Burundi, as it was only recently emerging from a civil war. There was a significant Tutsi population there prior to the genocide. Many of these Tutsi participated with the RPF in reestablishing peace in Rwanda, while others were killed by fleeing *Interahamwe*/FAR refugees in an attempt to finish their genocidal work.

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<sup>8</sup> A patron is called *shebuja* in *Kinyarwanda*, from the pre-colonial relationship of someone giving stewardship over a cow to another thus potentially elevating their status in the Rwandan society.

<sup>9</sup> Many informal interviews corroborated this view.

## **b) Intercontinental Relationships**

The other main category of perspectives that need to be taken into account is those of the Western nations—USA, Belgium, UK, and France—as well as the Eastern ones, Japan, China, India, and Korea.

The US and UK have both increased aid to and dialogue with Rwanda since the RPF came into power. The EU has continued to support Rwanda, as well. All of these entities have made significant contributions to Rwanda, as well as posing significant challenges to their humanitarian issues and governance needs along the way.

Belgium has remained involved in Rwandan politics and business. France, as has been previously mentioned, continues to try to disconnect itself from the stigma surrounding its actions and inaction during the genocide in '94, while trying to smear the Rwandan government with new allegations. France recently tried to extradite several members of the RPF government on genocidal charges, which were met by Rwanda's rejection of the French embassy to Rwanda (BBC News, 11/23/06). This action seems to be more political than judicial since the charges were eventually dropped (GLCSS, 11/24/06).

Further east, Rwanda has had interaction with India and North Korea. It seems that these relationships are in an effort to pursue the former's interests in the region. Japan has recently donated forty buses to the country and continues to support it with various types of material aid (Baguma, 8/10/06). Many of the machetes that were used in the genocide were manufactured in China. They have maintained a positive relationship with both the Habyarimana and RPF administration.

## 4. Genocidal Ideology

One of the goals of this report is to help the reader advance in understanding the Rwandan milieu. It is difficult to do this unless one reads the books, walks through the country, smells the inside of a genocidal crypt, and then paradoxically hears children scream “*umuzungu!*” which is translated “you are not black!” and guffaw with laughter as one walks past.

Most days it is also hard to understand what life would have been like in the country by the end of April 1994: blood in the streets, maggots and flies, dogs eating corpses-- heinous circumstances. All of this was the result of individual decisions. People learn by example and by those in authority over them. This happens through formal means, such as education and law, and informal means, such as telling stories to one’s children. Individuals start with ideals and learn how to compare those ideals to real and present circumstances.

There were inequities between the ruling-class Tutsis and Hutus, and the common working-class clansmen (Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa) prior to colonial influence. Things got worse when the Belgian colonists chose to pit Tutsi against Hutu, and then the reversal occurred when the Belgians left placing the Hutus in charge. Significantly, according to William Church (7/24/06), there were also 300 years of tradition of both blood revenge and a tradition of mediation and forgiveness, which was initiated by the *Mwami* and is the foundation of the present-day *Gacaca* community-based justice system. Church went on to say that revenge is outlawed now.

Ideologies emerged out of this change in power. One of the strongest came from Hutus who felt pushed down by the Tutsis during colonial rule as well as during the last

*Mwami*'s, Rwabugiri's, strongly authoritative reign prior to colonialism, which Vansina (2004) terms a "tide of violence" (p. 165). This turned into the perception that there has been a history of strong ethnic violence and cruelty. As has been stated, it seems that prior to Rwabugiri's rule, while there was a class distinction, the main conflict was between rival clans rather than ethnic groups (Nsenga, 7/15/06).

There is a clear relationship between famine and violence. Rwanda is the most populated country in Africa per unit area. It is almost completely dependent on subsistence agriculture for food and income. The country has a very high birth rate, as well: the average Rwandan woman gives birth to eight children during her lifetime, one of the highest in the world. The economy is also significantly undiversified. Its only major exports are coffee and tea, and small amounts of tin, natural gas, tungsten, and coltan. If there is any kind of famine or hiccup in the international market, the high level of poverty could quickly lead to very difficult times for most of the population very quickly. Psychologically, difficult times are made easier through the use of a scapegoat. For the Hutus during the time of the republic, from 1959 to the early 1990s, this scapegoat was the Tutsis.

Tutsis were denied university education and public representation as their Hutu clansmen had been before. There was also an emergence of hate ideology that was directed toward Tutsis. The *Interahamwe*/FAR engaged in preparations for genocide with at least the partial knowledge of late Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana as well as many governments around the world.<sup>10</sup> This so called "genocidal ideology" is most easily described through quotations.

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<sup>10</sup> Note that prior to the departure of Belgian colonizers, the Hutu were also unfairly treated, but this injustice came primarily from the Belgians as opposed to the Tutsi. The colonial attitudes held toward the

In December 1990, Hassan Ngeze published the Hutu Ten Commandments in a newspaper called *Kangura*. They are as follows:

1. Every Hutu must know that the Tutsi woman, wherever she may be, is working for the Tutsi ethnic cause. In consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who:

- Acquires a Tutsi wife;
- Acquires a Tutsi concubine;
- Acquires a Tutsi secretary or protégé.

2. Every Hutu must know that our Hutu daughters are more worthy and more conscientious as women, as wives and as mothers. Aren't they lovely, excellent secretaries, and more honest!

3. Hutu women, be vigilant and make sure that your husbands, brothers and sons see reason.

4. All Hutus must know that all Tutsis are dishonest in business. Their only goal is ethnic superiority. We have learned this by experience. In consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who:

- Forms a business alliance with a Tutsi;

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Hutu produced a negative impact on the Hutu political, economic, and educational development, although it could not be said that systematic wholesale murders occurred. These attitudes were perpetrated by the colonizers as opposed to the average Rwandan.

- Invests his own funds or public funds in a Tutsi enterprise;
- Borrows money from or loans money to a Tutsi;
- Grants favors to Tutsis (import licenses, bank loans, land for construction, public markets...)

5. Strategic positions such as politics, administration, economics, the military and security must be restricted to the Hutu.

6. A Hutu majority must prevail throughout the educational system (pupils, scholars, teachers).

7. The Rwandan Army must be exclusively Hutu. The war of October 1990 has taught us that. No soldier may marry a Tutsi woman.

8. Hutu must stop taking pity on the Tutsi.

9. Hutu wherever they be must stand united, in solidarity, and concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers. Hutu within and without Rwanda must constantly search for friends and allies to the Hutu Cause, beginning with their Bantu brothers.

-Hutu must constantly counter Tutsi propaganda.

-Hutu must stand firm and vigilant against their common enemy:  
the Tutsi.

10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961 and the Hutu Ideology must be taught to Hutu of every age. Every Hutu must spread the word wherever he goes. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for spreading and teaching this ideology is a traitor. (see works cited for URL)

This document was seen as a proof of Rwanda's freedom of the press by Habyarimana. "Community leaders across Rwanda regarded them as tantamount to law, and read them aloud at public meetings. . . . the eighth and most quoted commandment said 'Hutus must stop having mercy on the Tutsis'" (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 88). This document defines the means that have been used to objectify the Tutsis during the Habyarimana reign, and it makes clear the goals of the genocidal ideology. Another significant public example of this type of thinking is former president Bizimungu's threat that the Tutsis would be killed and chased out again in 10 to 15 years.

It could never be said that every Hutu agreed with this type of thinking. Many people put their lives on the line to protect friends, neighbors, family, and even total strangers. One of the interviewees was hidden by her gardener (Uwizerwa, 8/7/06), and witness "JJ" from *Key to my Neighbor's House* was fed by a stranger: "He was a Hutu, but one who cannot harm . . . not everyone killed" (Neuffer, 2001, p. 287). One of the most agonizing interactions this ideology created was when Hutu men were forced to kill their Tutsi wives. As was discussed earlier, one interviewee's brother, who came from a mixed-race family, chose to join the *Interahamwe* even with Tutsi lineage, so he could prove his commitment to the cause, thereby saving the lives of the rest of his Tutsi family (Biseruka, 7/31/06).

This ideology, in conjunction with the colonial experience, precipitated the 1994 genocide. In contrast, the present Rwandan government is attempting to create a government of national unity. They are trying to create a Rwandan national identity, rather than one defined by ethnicity. This is being enacted at many levels. The FDLR actively oppose the RPF politically and in some cases militarily in an attempt to halt Rwanda's delicate national redevelopment. As has been stated prior in this work, the French are also frequently implicated in both news and literature as being complicitous in the original genocidal actions while still actively functioning against Rwanda in a diplomatic capacity.<sup>11</sup>

Dr. Gregory H. Stanton (1998) from the organization Genocide Watch discusses how every country has divisions of “us” and “them”—Germans and Jews, Hutu and Tutsi, Canadians and those from the US. If these categories progress, groups tend to objectify one another using racist or ethnic jokes and other types of rhetorical stereotypes. These objectifications turn into degrading nicknames like *inyenzi* (literally “cockroach” in *Kinyarwanda*), among others. These names and attitudes may eventually begin to dehumanize the group. Soon this less formal rhetoric becomes systemized by the government and other politically or ideologically motivated groups, which leads to discrimination at an institutional level and polarization, further segregating these two groups.

If trends continue, these groups begin to organize into identifiable categories by

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<sup>11</sup> Zac Nsenga (personal communication, 8/15/06) discusses this as well as another recent (2007, 5 July) BBC article: “This week saw more reports that France was aware of the planned genocide but chose to continue co-operation with the Rwandan army that was going to perpetrate it.”

using some type of systematic mark. This is typified by the Jews' yellow badges during the Nazi era of Germany or identity cards in Rwanda. Once dehumanized and thus marked, extermination becomes an act of killing an inhuman mass rather than flesh-and-blood people. The final stage of genocide is described in an article by Rwandan Brigadier General Frank K. Rusagara:

The last stage is the negation or denial of the genocide, but which is manifest in every stage in the continuum. . . . [This denial] itself is an in-built mechanism in all the stages of the process to assure oneself that nothing wrong is being done, and propel the actor[s] to the next stage. . . . [It] is therefore a dilemma because not all Rwandans accept the fact of the genocide, which has become a way of life . . . that is, we the Hutu and they the Tutsi and vice versa, and therefore not Rwandans but enemies and allies. The post-genocide military campaigns will suffice to illustrate this polarisation. After committing the Genocide at the urging of the *genocidaire* regime, Rwandans were persuaded to vacate the country, seeing it as having been taken over by alien invaders. (17 September 2006)

This again illustrates the complexities facing the current government.

There have been numerous allegations and accusations relating to genocidal ideology. In fact, in recent history, since physical security has increased, this is probably the most frequently quoted allegation. Indeed, one of the most significant issues faced by Rwanda is the trial of all the detainees in its legal system (which will be discussed in the justice section). According to Gourevitch (1998), prisoners used to openly confess to participating in the genocide as he conducted interviews, but now they have realized that this is a "strategic error":

In the early days after the genocide, it had been easy for visitors to find perpetrators, in the jails and the refugee camps and also on the streets of Rwanda, who admitted to taking part in the killings and even boasted about it. Yet by the time I began visiting Rwanda the criminals had realized that confession was a tactical error. In the prisons and the border camps, *I couldn't find anyone who would even agree that there had been a genocide*. There had been civil war, yes, and some massacres, but nobody acknowledged seeing anything. *Every one of the scores of prisoners I spoke with claimed to be unjustly arrested*. (p. 244, italics added)

As Stanton (1998) says, denial is the final step of a genocidal act. It is no mistake that certain factions of neo-Nazis in Germany are denying the Holocaust, and most of Turkey still denies the Armenian genocide. The current president of the FDLR, Ignace Murwanashyaka, presently residing in Germany, went on record on IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks), saying, "I am not afraid to go to any court because my conscience is clean." ([globalsecurity.org](http://globalsecurity.org) see works cited for complete URL)

To reiterate a previous point, those who attempt to draw a counter genocidal definition from any of the RPF's actions since April 1994 must remember that the *Interahamwe/FAR* attempted to wipe out the Tutsi population, whereas the RPF saved the ethnically mixed remainder of the country from harm. These two ideologies are mutually exclusive, and the population of Rwanda understands this. Very simply, if the population expects one to kill, there is no way they can trust him.

So what does all of this mean? Rwanda at this time needs unity and a unified national identity more than it needs diversity. The government and president understand

this and respond accordingly by silencing voices that try to create division along ethnic lines within the country. There was too much carnage and difficulty in the past to allow people to be cavalier with their words. There will be a thorough treatment of both freedom of speech and freedom of press later in this work, as well as a discussion of the identity-based politics and rhetoric of Paul Rusesabagina.

## **5. Rural vs. Urban Distinction**

While the research was conducted, a great contrast became evident between rural and urban development, including education and literacy, as well as infrastructure and agriculture. One of the Rwandans who helped with translation felt he needed to be reminded of the needs of the people outside the capital city of Kigali, because even those Rwandans who are always in the city have difficulty seeing these contrasts. The contrast is so significant that it may be necessary to define the terms: development that focuses on urban settings without looking at rural areas is “theoretical development,” whereas development that takes the entire country into account is “actual development.” Many of the interviewees said the greatest challenge faced by Rwanda today is poverty. This dearth of resources in conjunction with undiversified agricultural structures can likely lead to huge difficulties and must be taken into consideration (Organization 3, 8/14/06).

Kigali, Rwanda’s capital and most populous city, is well maintained, clean, and well organized. One frequently meets university students and people who work in business. It is also easy to get into conversations about politics and philosophy, to discuss Rwanda’s past and future. As the center of most of Rwanda’s infrastructure, it is logical that resources are concentrated on the cities, though this may make villages wait longer for help.

When one travels outside Kigali or other major Rwandan cities such as Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, or Butare, one is struck by the agrarian nature of the society. People can be seen racing down hills on their bikes, heavy laden with jerry cans full of water or banana beer, or walking with huge loads of cabbages or sorghum on their heads, backs or bicycles. They sell chickens, eggs, and bananas on the side of the road. When talking with these people, it was clear that the basic rural needs were different from those in the cities. People were worried about educational expenses, drought, and the capabilities to buy and sell food and feed their families. They seemed less inclined to think about politics and were more concerned with voting for someone they had seen with their own eyes (Confidential, 8/22/06). They needed their roads to be maintained and upgraded from dirt to asphalt. They needed electricity and more access to potable water (Raura Sambura Mucina, 8/24/06). They needed to know that people in the government heard them. One interviewee felt the government sympathized with those in rural areas but lacked the resources to respond to their needs as quickly as they needed them (Confidential, 8/22/06). They had limited access to land telephone lines but significant access to cellular phones. Most of them lacked Internet access, seldom saw newspapers, and, taking into account interviewees' views of educational challenges, were likely to be only partially literate. All of this must be considered as one looks at the direction Rwanda is heading and the future goals the government is setting for itself. There will be a significant section on future trends and development later in this report.