

I. Literature Review & Review of Regional & Ethnic History

The author read most of the books available concerning Rwanda which have been published in or translated into English. While considering these different perspectives on the genocide and the present governmental and geopolitical milieu for the country, it was clear that there are numerous parties with differing perspectives describing why the genocide and subsequent events occurred. Some points from interviews will also be included in order to give a fuller understanding of the context from which this report emerges.

Many people have much to lose amid the discussion of the genocide. It is a difficult and often shameful topic because, even with the most liberal interpretations from both sides, the fact stands that there was a movement, led by the military and politicians and encompassing every portion of society, to murder a significant percentage of an ethnic and/or political population inside Rwanda and then erase their memories. This murder was a genocide. This intention spilled over the borders of Rwanda into Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as well.

One interview source¹ said that what Rwanda needs above all else is a “history that accommodates everyone’s story, [both] Hutu [and] Tutsi” (Interviewee 5A, 8/29/06).

Most of the narrative histories from most of those interviewed told a similar story.

Differences in these historical perspectives lay only in the emphasis of certain items after

¹ Note that seven interview sources requested that they not be specifically named. For the sake of confidentiality, the names of their organizations, as well as the individuals who were interviewed, are denoted by a number and a letter (i.e., interviewee 5A, the first person interviewed from Organization 5, the fifth unnamed source). Or simply denoted as a “confidential source”

the colonial period. One example of this is *Interahamwe* ideology, where history started to focus on Tutsis as different; it described them as oppressive and historically foreign to Rwanda. In contrast, the other popular voice, which is more in line with the present government and mainstream Rwanda educational values, describes Rwandan ethnic history as Tutsis making up most of the monarchy while also representing a sizable working-class population. Significantly, this view shows the Tutsi monarchs as a historically mixed population in regard to their motives; some were benevolent to the populace while others pursued more self-seeking ends.

To fully appreciate the complexity of this situation, consider the ancient history of Rwanda leading up to colonialism. The narrative history of Rwanda goes back to approximately the 1300s (Zac Nsenga, 8/15/06). There were three distinct ethnic groups: *Bahutu*, *Batutsi*, and *Batwa* (hence Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa). These groups lived on the hills and plains *together*, and continue to live *together* throughout present-day Rwanda and Burundi. Their territory would also have been demographically and ethnically similar in some portions of Uganda, Tanzania, and the DRC. Each ethnic group would generally have been confined to a narrowly defined line of work, which would suggest that the Bahutu, Batutsi, and Batwa labels indicated a class distinction instead of a pure ethnic category. That being said, there were definitely distinct ethnic features associated, at least stereotypically, with the different groups. Tutsis tended to be taller, with more angular noses, and were employed as cow herders. Hutus² would have been shorter than Tutsis and primarily planted and harvested crops. Twa were quite small (some refer to them as pygmies or pygmoid), and they made pots and lived in the forest. All of these ethnic

² Please note Hutu and Hutus are both considered pluralized in *Kinyarwanda*, as are Tutsi and Tutsis

descriptions are broad generalizations and, because of intermarriage and class blurring, often do not accurately describe present Rwandan context.

Another complication is the ability for these so-called ethnicities to shift across class lines. For instance, the *Mwami* (*Kinyarwanda* for “King,” an absolute ruler in Rwanda), could determine that he wanted to have certain Hutus manage some of his herd (a profound honor). By bestowing a certain number of cows on this person, the Mwami could change his identity from Hutu to Tutsi. To complicate the issue, a person of certain status as a Tutsi could address another Tutsi of lower status as “his *Mahutu*.” All these distinctions were accentuated by the Belgian colonizers,³ as they created ethnic identity cards and were then perpetuated and institutionalized by the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes. The polarity shifted however with these leaders to favor the Hutus over the Tutsis instead of Tutsis over Hutus as the colonizers had initially done (Dr. Sezibera, 8/28/06).⁴

All these groups were mixed into one of the 18 clans, would have called their co-clansman brothers and sisters (regardless of ethnic or hierarchical background), would still be able to tell you their clan affiliations today, and would not have been able to marry within their own clans (Sezibera, 8/28/06). They spoke the same language and lived in all of the same communities, worshiped the same gods, and shared the same creation story. They also would have submitted to the same *Mwami*, who would have been of Tutsi origin. The *Mwamis* eventually were able to consolidate their rules over their fiefdoms and field larger armies to protect themselves against the encroaching slave

³ The Belgians gained Rwanda as a colony in 1923 after Germany was stripped of its colonies following World War I.

⁴ Dr. Sezibera is an adviser to the president and special envoy to the Great Lakes Region

trade (Prunier, 1995, p. 2); however, there are some examples of the clans fighting each other as well (Zac Nsenga, 7/15/06).

Rwanda had and continues to have a limitation of natural resources, which made it less interesting to prying colonial interests. These so-called ethnic groups had similar diets and shared land together. It does not seem like they had a lot of conflict other than Tutsi cows trampling Hutu crops.

Rwanda is made up of numerous hills. As a result, there was a certain natural avoidance by explorers and colonizers (Prunier, 1995, p. 2). At this point it can be said that Rwanda had one of the most developed social structures in Africa: each community was organized in levels, from the king to leaders of every ten households. They are also a very compact nation with a high population density, as well as limited natural resources other than subsistence farming. Rwanda was a relatively late entry into the European race for African colonies. This allowed them to develop without external interference for many years longer than most of the other nations in the region.

Before colonization, the primary interaction between Rwanda and the outside world was warfare with other nation-states and fighting against slave traders (Prunier, 1995, p.15). The *Mwamis* continued to consolidate their respective rules, and some sources complain of heightened greed during this period as the *Mwamis* had access to more material possessions and resources. This has led to a perception that the monarchy had oppressive tendencies (although these kings were never as tyrannical in their rule as the Belgian colonizers), which is shown by the aforementioned flexibility of the social hierarchies, whereas the Belgian colonizers actually solidified the class distinctions through eugenic philosophy and ethnic identity cards).

When the Germans started to arrive in 1894, they wooed, then politically coerced the *Mwami*'s to rule for them. Although there were fewer than 100 people from Germany who were ever actually in Rwanda, Jan Vansina said the *Mwami* at the time, named Musinga, would likely not have maintained his position as *Mwami* without the Germans' support (Vansina, 2004, p. 179). According to Bishop John Rucyahana (8/8/06), the Germans preferred to rule by proxy. The Congolese military were used as a police force by the Germans when they needed them.

The Belgians acquired Rwanda and Burundi in 1920 as spoils of war (Germany lost colonies after WWI) and soon initiated their separation of ethnicities according to their imposed demographics of 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa to ease the process of their rule. The Belgians saw Tutsis as more noble than Hutus and in no way related to the “‘negroes’ . . . who belonged ‘to an absolutely inferior order’” (Prunier, 1995, p. 8). This was done in some cases by measuring a person's nose and forehead to determine his ethnic heritage. The Belgians also used the *Mwami* as a puppet leader until his death in 1959, although they changed his method of ascension to monarchy to adhere to their goals. At another point, they also dismissed a *Mwami* who became too unruly for them. “The Belgians never liked [King Yuhi V] Musinga⁵; he had fought alongside the Germans against them, his mother was a pest, he was openly adulterous, bisexual and incestuous, he never converted to Christianity, and he deviously tried to hijack the white man's civilizing mission for his political benefit” (Prunier, 1995, p. 30). The culmination of these measurements and policies was the issuing of a card that defined the individual's race as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa.

⁵ The previous king.

When the Belgians left, they changed their traditional support for the Tutsis and the Tutsi monarchy in exchange for a policy advocating the Hutus. Political parties formed, and the Belgian colonel, Guy Logiest, arrived in Rwanda on November 4, 1959 to work out the military details of withdrawal. He is quoted as saying:

Some among my assistants thought that I was wrong in being so partial against the Tutsi and that I was leading Rwanda on a road towards democratization whose end was distant and uncertain . . . No, the time was crucial for Rwanda. Its people needed support and protection. My role was essential and it was important that I could play it to the final verdict which would come from the communal elections. Today, twenty-five years later, I ask myself what made me act with such resolution. It was without a doubt the will to give the people back their dignity.
(Prunier, 1995, p. 49)

This Belgian shift in allegiance at the pivotal moment of decolonization resembled, according to Prunier (1995), an “ethnic transfer of power” (p. 51). From this point until after the genocide, ethnic segregation for schooling favored the Hutus instead of the Tutsis, a reversal of the previous Belgian policy. This was easy to do because the Belgians had already “classified” everyone with their identity card system.⁶ This shift represented a revolution from the perspective of many Hutus and was magnified in its significance by the ensuing leaders and historians.

In truth there was a definite need for balancing the system that the Belgians created, a system that discriminated against the Hutus in education, policy making, and

⁶ Incidentally, the Belgians and South Africans were the only groups other than the Nazis in recent history to use identity cards to designate ethnicity.

hiring for governmental positions to name a few. The new reversed discrimination, which was no longer colonially imposed, only exacerbated past conflicts.

When president Kayibanda was elected in 1961, Rwandans began to hear of Tutsis being publicly humiliated in school, or being denied the opportunity of passing entrance exams so they could move on to their next level of education, regardless of their academic abilities. Interviewee 4A (8/16/06) went so far as to call these policies “intellectual genocide.” These circumstances coincide with other genocidal activities and fear tactics (William Church, 7/24/06). The upshot of this was that many Tutsis fled into Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania. Zac Nsenga (7/15/07) discussed how he and his friends used to cross the border back into Rwanda and see partially buried skeletons of many Tutsi that had been purged in the Hutu revolution starting in 1959.

Narratives began to emerge about Tutsis being a non-indigenous group within Rwanda and that they had come from the outside to impose their views on the native Hutu and Twa populations, casting them as oppressors. Some of the actions undertaken by the *Mwamis* would have constituted oppression, particularly the last two kings, who would have been seen as imposing their goals on the population in a barely supportable fashion, which led to conditions of severe impoverishment for many Rwandese through means of compulsory *umuganda* (which literally means community work in *Kinyarwanda*), taxation, and other types of assistance to the monarchy.

The work days in particular brought very mixed reviews in the research. *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda* made them sound initially benign, but then developing into something much more difficult for the populace, as the greed of the *Mwamis* grew, and, as Vansina (2004) said, “terror ruled” (p. 180). *Umuganda* was also instituted by both the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes. The present administration also requests

that the population spend the last Saturday of each month in community work. The author watched as they did this: people got together and would have a fairly large goal in mind, such as clearing a section of road from overgrown bushes, or rebuilding a trail system on a hill. It seems to take the place of certain public works systems that are still not affordable to the state. According to an interview with Tom Baguma:

[On the] last Saturday of the month, the whole community helps with a community problem (mowing a road, irrigation, erosion). [The] major resource is the human resource. Here the whole is voluntary—but 100% participate. They sing, they enjoy. . . . There are also meetings concerning local issues during the work day. (8/10/06)

These work days fulfill a lot of needs and seem to be culturally applicable as they have been done for centuries. It is one of the topics about which the government will have to seek to acquire feedback from the population.

Many Tutsis fled the country during the 1959 killings and subsequent smaller massacres. These refugees later wished to return to their homeland, but were prohibited, partly due to discrimination against Tutsis, partly because their return would strain the already overpopulated, primarily agrarian society. According to one confidential source, former president Kayibanda described their repatriation using the metaphor of too much water pouring into a glass, causing it to overflow (8/25/06). The tens of thousands of Tutsis near the borders hoping to come back were frustrated and began to mount incursions back into their homeland. This was the first time that the derogatory term “*Inyenzi*” (meaning “cockroach”) was used, because they were primarily attacked by night. It shows that there was already inflexibility toward the Tutsis. The population of Rwanda

was and is the densest per unit area of any country in Africa. Further, the country has limited mineral resources (including tungsten, natural gas, tin, and coltan) and undifferentiated agricultural resources, so when coffee and tea have a bad year, it affects the whole country.

Kayibanda was ousted by Major General Habyarimana in 1972 in a coup de tat, and the former president was reportedly starved to death in a Rwandan prison (Prunier, 1995, p. 82). This new presidential regime continued the subjugation of Tutsis. He also nationalized many private companies, which quickly caused the country to plummet into even more impoverished conditions. In contrast to Kayibanda, whose family was from the area around Butare, Habyarimana was from the north. However, like Kayibanda, Habyarimana tended to give jobs and special treatment to Hutus from his region. His political allies and supporters were called the “*Akazu*,” which literally means the “little house.” Agathe Kanzinga was Habyarimana’s wife. She came from one of the independent Hutu chiefdoms, which still existed as late as the 1920s. She was very powerful. Many intimated that she had more power than the president. Prunier (1995) went so far as to say that Habyarimana eventually became her family’s “prisoner” and “victim” (p. 86-87).

By 1990 there was already an established animosity between Habyarimana and the refugee Tutsis constituting the RPF, who resided primarily in Uganda. These refugees were mostly the children of those who had fled between 1959 and 1961. They had helped Yoweri Kaguta Museveni in his war against Idi Amin and Milton Obote, the dictatorial rulers of Uganda. They also helped to install Museveni as president of Uganda. As they fought for freedom in Uganda, they hoped to return to the homeland of their parents.

They learned discipline and guerilla warfare through the practical means of participation and used weapons from the Ugandan army in the first ill-fated foray into Rwanda. This action took the life of Major General Fred Rwigyema and many others. After these skirmishes, they retreated to Uganda to train and become a much more disciplined force. At this point, Paul Kagame became the dynamic leader of the organization, and the RPF became the disciplined military that now projects into the entire region. Within about eighteen months, Habyarimana was being significantly challenged by these incursions into northeast Rwanda. He also had a population that desperately wanted democracy. He eventually had to agree to a democratic coalition cabinet and peace negotiations with the RPF (Prunier, 1995, p. 145). These military actions had escalated in the minds of Rwandans as well as Rwandan and international media outlets to the point of “civil war”. They also led the Rwandan president to call in military assistance from France, which will be discussed later.

Habyarimana would not let Tutsis come back into the country, either. Some said that many Tutsis were able to prosper during this time in areas outside of the realm of politics. “While still barred from government posts, the country’s Tutsi had more opportunities; they were allowed to take part in business, and many became successful entrepreneurs” (Neuffer, 2001, p. 94). Regional politics continued to deteriorate. The Arusha Accords were supposed to bring Habyarimana and the RPF into dialogue and stop the civil war, but Habyarimana continued to hesitate for political motivations, drawing out the process through his indecision concerning an actual democratic, multiparty system of governance (Prunier, 1995, p. 186).

Inside Rwanda, there were so many opinions embroiling the constituents in regard to emerging democracy and ongoing civil war that the president was able to do as he pleased while these other players attempted to reach a quorum. By 1993, however, Habyarimana was forced to comply with the Arusha Accords he and the RPF had signed. The radical elements in his administration started to perceive him as soft in his treatment of the Tutsis because he signed the peace accords. Things went so far that Romeo Dallaire⁷ (2004) said, “The president was no longer in charge . . . and the MRND [French: Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement] (English: National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development) was operating independently of him” (p. 162).

The MRND came into existence in 1993 and was the ultra ethno-nationalist party that strongly espoused Hutu power rhetoric (Dallaire, 2004, p. 535). This is the point when the genocidal ideology began to operate in full swing, defining its “zero network” to eradicate all Rwandan Tutsi.⁸

France was another significant player at this point in Rwanda’s history. They contributed arms, troops, training, and logistical resources to the emerging Hutu power movement. According to Andrew Wallis (2006), in October 1990, Jean Christophe Mitterrand, son of former French president Francois Mitterrand, said, “We’ll send old man Habyarimana a few troops; we’re going to bail him out” (p. 24). These resources helped the Rwandan military fight the RPF, but also contributed to arming and developing the *Interahamwe* forces. Wallis (2006) also quotes Janvier Afrika, who witnessed anti-Tutsi meetings prior to the genocide: “The French military office was [in

⁷ General Romeo Dallaire was in charge of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) forces.

⁸ An entire section will be devoted to this type of genocidal ideology later in this report.

Kigali]. . . I saw the French show [the] Interahamwe how to throw knives and how to assemble and disassemble guns. . . [before that] we didn't know how to use the arms which had been brought from France" (p. 56-57).

By the end of 1993, UNAMIR was well underway in its peace-keeping mission to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords. On January 10, 1994, they received word from an informant, whom Dallaire gave the pseudonym Jean-Pierre, that "when the time came . . . the Tutsis could be rounded up and exterminated. . . when turned loose on the population, [they could kill] a thousand Tutsis in Kigali within twenty minutes of receiving the order" (Dallaire, 2004, p. 142). Jean-Pierre also discussed knowledge of a location of a cache of weapons. Romeo Dallaire requested permission to raid these arms and was denied by the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) by the order of Kofi Annan and the others in the triumvirate of the DPKO:

Annan spelled out in excruciating detail the limits New York was placing on me as force commander . . . not only was I not allowed to conduct deterrent operations in support of UNAMIR, but in the interests of transparency, I was to provide the information that Jean Pierre had given us to President Habyarimana immediately. (Dallaire, 2004, p. 146)

Part of the Arusha agreement allowed the RPF to enter Kigali and occupy some ground. They chose the parliament building as their base of operations. This put them in a very central and easily defensible position on the top of a hill near the center of Kigali.

Meanwhile, the nationwide radio station, RTLM, (*Radio Television des Mille Collines*) continued to espouse its genocidal ideology toward all Tutsis. It was funded by Habyarimana and other members of the government. They had one particularly

interesting broadcast on Sunday, April 3, 1994 which said, “On the 3rd, 4th, and 5th, heads will get heated up. On [6th of April] there will be a respite but ‘a little thing’ might happen. Then on the 7th and the eighth and the other days in April, you will see something” (Prunier, 1995, p. 223). President Habyarimana’s (which included President Ntaryamira of Burundi) plane was shot down by two shoulder-mounted missiles on the evening of April 6 as he flew back from Tanzania. The genocide had begun.

This plane crash creates many of the most hotly debated portions of the history of the genocide. There are allegations against France, Habyarimana’s own soldiers, the MRND, and the RPF. The plane wreckage was never allowed to be analyzed because the presidential guard was protecting it.

The evidence implicating the RPF in this disaster seemed difficult to substantiate.⁹ There was credible evidence, however, that directed the guilt away from the RPF and towards the genocidal *Interahamwe*’s planners. Rwandan Ambassador to the US Zac Nsenga (7/15/06) asked why Dallaire could not investigate as he was asked repeatedly to do. He also questioned the feasibility of the RPF gaining access to the presidential guard barracks,¹⁰ the alleged launch site for the attacks, armed with shoulder-mounted missiles. He asked, “Why didn’t France investigate at that time, instead opting for a retro-

⁹ The French in particular as well as former Interahamwe (FDLR) continue to disagree and say that the RPF started the genocide: “In November 2006, a French antiterrorism judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière, issued a stunning accusation that Kagame and nine of his associates had planned the attack on Habyarimana’s plane. Although Kagame, as a head of state, has immunity under French law, the public prosecutor’s office in Paris approved the judge’s request for international arrest warrants for the nine others. Bruguière, who had been investigating the downing of the aircraft on behalf of the families of the plane’s French crew, based his charges on the testimony of former members of Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front. He did not consider other suspects or visit Rwanda. After he issued his charges, Rwanda broke diplomatic relations with France.” (Kinzer, 2007)

¹⁰ Numerous eyewitnesses place the missile launch site here, though as with many portions of this report, there are dissenting voices on this topic.

investigation . . . which is what they continue to do almost 13 years after the fact on behalf of the families of the two French pilots who manned the ill-fated flight.”

Nsenga (7/15/06) also pointed out that Habyarimana had just signed a peace agreement with the RPF that gave the RPF almost everything they had asked for. He notes as well that “the plane crash and the genocide were not spontaneous; they were actually almost simultaneous and organized.” Further, the RPF was allowing Habyarimana to remain president during the period of governmental transition laid out by the Arusha Accords (Prunier, 1995, p. 166). The genocide memorial in Kigali echoes this last thought. It says that on the “6th April 1994 [at] 20:23 plane shot; 21:15 road blocks erected.” These roadblocks were the primary stage of *Interahamwe* atrocities.

How can the different players be perceived in their actions with regard to the genocide? The *Interahamwe* instigated the slaughter in a preplanned format, killing almost a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the most gruesome ways. At best, the RPF and RPA¹¹ orchestrated the rescue of the Tutsi population as well as that of the moderate Hutus, and by proxy the rest of the population of the country of Rwanda; at worst they orchestrated a “counter-genocide” (in which Tutsis and RPF designed a plot to eradicate the Hutu population in Rwanda). Some even go so far as to say that they designed the initial actions of the genocide, such as the plane crash, to give themselves license to enter the country and attack the *Interahamwe*/FAR (*Force Armee Rwandaise*, the Rwandan National Army under President Habyarimana) in the first place. It is the author’s opinion that both this and the previous “counter-genocide” theories are untenable,¹² as these acts

¹¹ Rwandese Patriotic Army, the military wing of the RPF. For ease of description, the author has chosen to use RPF to denote both RPF and RPA references in most instances.

¹² Although the RPF did commit acts of violence, (some of which could be described as atrocities, which will be discussed later), these violent acts were often committed as revenge (which is quite different from

seem to have been mostly precipitated by the murder of most of the existing Tutsi population, which often included the relatives and immediate families of the RPF.

Taking all of this into account, it cannot be said that the RPF ever planned on murdering the whole Hutu population (84% of the population, more than 6 million people). Their actions should be seen as the direct opposite, protecting the population from ethnic violence. Also, when their atrocities or violent acts were committed, there was swift justice done toward the RPF perpetrators of these acts (Rwingamba, 7/29/06). The RPF gave medical treatment to the people they met as they took the country from the *Interahamwe* (Nsenga, 7/15/06). Their continuing integration of numerous *Interahamwe* and exFAR (French- ex- Force Armeé Rwandaise, Habyarimana’s Rwandan national Army) soldiers into the RPF further negates this accusation according to Sayinzoga who is in charge of exFAR demobilization and reintegration. (9/1/06).

There are claims from those who are aligned against Paul Kagame and the RPF, whose strongest dissenting voice seems to represent that of the present-day FDLR¹³ (English “the Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda,” formerly the exFAR/*Interahamwe*). These claims are that the RPF arranged Habyarimana’s death, planned the slaughter of the entire Hutu ethnic group, and managed to dupe the international community by saying that there had been genocide in their country, when in actuality the number killed was comparable in both parties. When this does not convince the audience in question, they emphasize the ethnic inequalities and historical subjugation of the Hutus by the Tutsis, while essentially telling the Hutu population that Tutsis are

the premeditation of the *Interahamwe* forces) when a soldier would find his entire family raped, murdered, and unburied, or were in some cases related to poor military leadership. The word *atrocities* will continue to be used because it best describes these acts of violence, even considering the aforementioned extenuating circumstances. An armed soldier should never be allowed to exact violence on an unarmed civilian.

¹³ (*French*) *Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda*

causing all the ills in the country. In a semiliterate country, without a lot of emphasis on public dissent or substantiation of arguments, this was a very effective means in co-opting a significant portion of the population—about half of the Hutu presence in the country, 3 million people—into their political ideology. Gerard Prunier (1995) says:

Readers . . . should remember one simple but major point: although Rwanda was definitely not a land of peace and bucolic harmony before the arrival of Europeans, there is no trace in its pre-colonial history of systematic violence between Hutu and Tutsi as such. There were plenty of wars, both domestic and foreign, but they either pitted the *Banyarwanda* as a group against foreign tribes or kingdoms; or briefly saw chiefly lineages fighting each other to control some seat of local power, with all the *abagaragu*¹⁴ at the *shebuja*'s¹⁵ side, whether Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa. These wars, like all wars, caused deaths—probably on the scale of the wars between Picts and Scots or among the Gallic tribes at the time of Julius Caesar. But they were never on the scale we have witnessed since independence and which eventually culminated with the 1994 horror. (p. 39)

Outside of Rwanda, there are even more participants in this political battle. The United Nations, its DPKO, including Kofi Annan,¹⁶ and its constituent countries (particularly those on the security council) dragged their feet by sending an ill-equipped and often unwilling UNAMIR to lend oversight to the star-crossed Arusha Accords. This

¹⁴ *Kinyarwanda* for client, one who is hierarchically beholden to another, such as a chief or king.

¹⁵ *Kinyarwanda* for patron, likely someone with material wealth, who has *abaragu*.

¹⁶ Kofi Annan later expressed significant concern over the UN's inability to halt the genocide: 'The international community is guilty of sins of omission.. the international community failed Rwanda and that must leave us always with a sense of bitter regret' Mr Annan said. He said the painful memory had influenced many of his later decisions as secretary general. 'I believed at that time that I was doing my best,' he said. 'But I realised after the genocide that there was more that I could and should have done to sound the alarm and rally support.' (BBC News 7/23/07)

process was supposed to lead the late President Habyarimana and his regime into a multi-party system in conjunction with the RPF and other political parties. Even more scathing was the fact that Rwanda was on the UN Security Council at the time of the hundred days of slaughter and that the US was unwilling to assist (Power, 2004, p. 85). Both the US and the UN were reeling in the wake of the botched Somali “peace enforcement” mission.

The United States went so far as to “rent” broken troop transport vehicles, without tools or spare parts, to the under-equipped UNAMIR. Both of these entities avoided using the word “genocide” to describe the murders in Rwanda. If they had admitted that what was happening was indeed genocide, they would have been required to respond as quickly as possible because of the 1948 *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, which states that:

genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world, recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, and being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required. . . . The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

Instead, the response of the UN was to decrease its forces in Kigali. The response of the other world powers was to not use the word “genocide” in their public discourse so they would not be held culpable for their inaction. This is true with the exception of the Czech

Republic, Nigeria, and New Zealand, who all lobbied for some type of direct intervention in Rwanda, although UN politics eventually shut them down (Barnett, 2002, p. 20).

Members of the EU were in similar straits. Belgium, having withdrawn from Rwanda as a colonial power between 1959 and 1962, sent a large peace-keeping force with the UNAMIR mission, only to withdraw them in the early stages of the genocide after ten of their soldiers were horrifically executed. Their withdrawal removed a significant military force and hamstrung the already struggling UNAMIR mission in effectiveness, as they were the largest, the best financially supported, and most logistically capable force in the UNAMIR contingent.

As has been stated previously, the most sensational performance came from France, who trained the FAR and members of the *Interahamwe* before the genocide (Dallaire, 2004, p. 62). They gave amnesty to the first lady of Rwanda after her husband's death and took in at least one *genocidaire*¹⁷ member of the Catholic clergy from the Kigali Church of the Holy Family. His name was Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka. Andrew Wallis (2006) says, “[Munyeshyaka] was said to have given the killers lists, pointed out Tutsi refugees to be murdered and forced a large number of Tutsi girls and women to sleep with him as a condition for being evacuated” (p. 197). Further, France imported weapons into Rwanda through multiple channels:

weapons and ammunition kept flowing in on direct orders from the highest circles of Elysee [France]. Nevertheless the vast size of the deliveries caused some problems . . . he had at times to struggle at meetings of the Interministerial Committee for War Materials Exports . . . to get approval for the impressive volume of lethal equipment which high government officials wanted to send to

¹⁷ *Genocidaire* denotes one who participated in the actions of the genocide at any level.

Kigali. In fact these administrative difficulties became so pressing that other solutions were found. In March 1992, the French government underwrote the financial risk of weapons deliveries to Rwanda from Egypt. . . . the total amount involved was US \$6 million. (Prunier, 1995, p. 148)

They later utilized a similar undertaking through South Africa (Prunier, 1995, p. 149).

France continually downplayed the nature of the genocide at several levels in the media and finally devised a strategy to create a safe zone called “zone turquoise,” ostensibly to curb the slaughter of ethnic Tutsis, their dependants, and moderate Hutus, but practically allowing a “safe zone” for *genocidaires* to continue their macabre “work”. This continuation was allowed through Turquoise’s not being allowed to disarm the *Interahamwe* in the zone (Dallaire, 2004, p. 457). This region was inaccessible to the advancing RPF and eventually led to an escape route into the Eastern DRC and former president Mobutu’s sympathetic regime.

The most complex issue relating to the post-genocide debacle, however, was the way that the world rallied around the humanitarian crises in the various refugee camps outside of Rwanda. Circumstances in these camps were extreme; there was cholera, trauma, and a transplanted totalitarian regime, which reigned supreme for more than a year after the exodus from Rwanda. Dallaire (2004) said that there were “2 million refugees . . . in camps . . . as well as . . . 1.7 million internally displaced persons [IDPs]” (p. 518). The refugees did have a host of life-threatening challenges while they waited in the refugee camps—overcrowding and posttraumatic stress disorder, as well as the aforementioned list—but they lived at a socioeconomic level much higher than those within Rwanda’s borders. Distressingly, the United Nations High Commission on

Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian aid organizations did not disarm the FAR/*Interahamwe* while allowing them to settle much closer to the border than was healthy or ethical for an armed movement (Zac Nsenga, 7/15/06). The result of this outpouring of Western goodwill was protection for the continued arming and training of the *Interahamwe*, which tripled in size, from 50,000 to 150,000, very close to the Rwandan borders in most cases (Nsenga, 7/15/06; Sezibera, 8/3/06).

These *Interahamwe* groups continued to cross over with military forces to commit genocidal and destabilizing acts until the late '90s, both in Rwanda and among the ethnic Tutsi population in the DRC (called *Banyamelenge*). This army was built in camps that were administered by the UNHCR and MSF (*Medicine Sans Frontiers*, "Doctors Without Borders"), as well as several other major NGOs. At this time, many members of the international community saw the RPF as a "rebel force" who had wrested the nation of Rwanda from the hands of its rightful rulers in a civil war. It took a while for the scope of the genocide, and the way that the actions of the RPF allowed for a mass protection of the Tutsis and the Hutus, to be revealed to Western eyes. The closure of these camps will be discussed in the DRC section later in this work.

This robust refugee aid stood in sharp contrast to the paltry assistance for Rwanda itself. The country was in ruins as the *Interahamwe* and FAR left, driving millions of the Hutu population in front of them with lies that the RPF would kill them as the RPF continued to wrest the country from *Interahamwe* and MRND control:

Even though many were fleeing of their own choice, the administrative authorities tried their best to get everybody to leave before the arrival of the RPF. . . . [one administrator] warned any who thought of staying behind that "the majority of the

population would be massacred.” In Butare, the militiamen forced everyone to flee, and those who refused were killed on the spot. (Prunier, 1995, p. 298)

This was compounded by the shame that many of them felt concerning slaughter (the most well-organized killing spree per capita in recent history, even more so than WWII’s holocaust), which made accepting the truth of what had really taken place in recent months even more challenging. The country was ransacked of all money, technology, infrastructure, and industry. The latrines and wells were crammed with the dead and dying. Dogs gnawed corpses in the streets, the police force and justice system were mostly complicit to the slaughter and therefore had already fled into DRC or Burundi, and all public records were destroyed. Those who were left behind were often maimed in soul if not in body. They were starting a new government with a very significant deficit.

All of this context must be taken into account as this report continues. As stated above, one cannot simply read a book or see a movie and feel convinced that they know what happened in those dark hundred days in 1994. Even though the genocide has stopped, Rwanda has continued to suffer some insecurity, from which it is only recently emerging. Meanwhile, they continue to grow in many positive ways.

Few of the sources talked about the redevelopment of the country in definitive terms. They mostly took a critical view of one or more of the programs that have been implemented to bring infrastructure, capacity building, healing, and justice to a country where more than 10% of the population had been murdered by their neighbors and friends.

There are a few books being written about this complex undertaking redevelopment by President Kagame, the RPF, and the citizens of Rwanda. Most notable

of these are Colin Waugh's *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front*, and *Rwanda: Towards Reconciliation, Good Governance and Development*, by Uma Shankar Jha and Surya Narayan Yadav.¹⁸ As the author continues to read on the Rwandan topic, it is often surprising to see the unconstructive critiques leveled at a country that needs such significant reconciliation. If the RPF had not stemmed the slaughter¹⁹, there simply may not be any Tutsis left within the borders of Rwanda.

A. General Context

This research represents a necessarily broad pursuit of the post-genocide development of Rwanda. This section seeks two different ends: first, to describe the themes that consistently emerged from the interviews; and second, to continue to pursue a description of the societal context from interview observations and discussion of human rights abuse allegations.

1. Ethnic Questions and General Context

“Discrimination can bring destruction in one day” (Interviewee 4A, 8/16/06). The ethnic question is the basis for most of the issues emerging from Rwanda from the time of colonization to the present. In Rwanda, it is more accurate to think of these categories

¹⁸ There is also an upcoming book by Stephen Kinzer called *Big Gamble in Rwanda* and focuses on President Kagame and his leadership in the country. It has not yet been released.

¹⁹ Note there are numerous voices which contrast the work of this research in that they were willing to draw more ethnically based distinctions. As has been stated prior, this work was undertaken with the end in mind of bringing more unity into the narratives about the country. These sources were read by the author but most of them had very little to say about Rwanda's goals for development. The best voices by far on the this topic were Rwandan nationals in-country, they made up the bulk of valuable data for this work. There is more on this topic in the Methods section as well as the Validation section.

as having their basis in class rather than ethnicity. All of the three so-called ethnic groupings originally shared food, language, and religion, as stated above. They were also members of the same 18 clans, and present-day Rwandans can still tell you what clan they are from (Bawaya, 8/10/06).

The colonial influence was negative for Rwanda in many ways. The Belgians' colonial propensity toward racism, as shown historically in the DRC, spread to Rwanda in significant ways. There was also manipulation of ethnic and national issues, as shown by their creation of the identity card system.

People who are interested in Rwanda invariably ask whether Hutus or Tutsis were met in the author's work in Rwanda. This is an inappropriate question to ask in almost every social circumstance in the present Rwandan context. The author chose not to ask directly about a person's ethnicity. This is hard to understand without viewing the context in Rwanda from several different perspectives, and it is tied to the root of many of the conflicts that exist presently.²⁰

Interviewee 5A (8/29/06) said that Rwanda "needs a history that accommodates everyone's story . . . Hutu and Tutsi." It is clear from the previous historical description of the genocide and events surrounding that time that the perspective of all people must be maintained and promoted by both the people in Rwanda and those outside the country. The present RPF government is attempting to unite these narratives through reconciliation, sensitization, and increasing and maintaining national security within Rwanda. The official title of the present administration, "the government of national unity," also sums up its primary purpose. All of the decisions in this government attempt

²⁰ The value of interview narratives in a primarily oral culture is difficult for those from a literate culture to understand in many cases. For the speakers in these cultures their words may weigh as heavily as formally published and printed documents.

to contribute to these goals, though they have frequently been accused of the contrary. To this end, the government will not allow genocidal ideology: “Propagation of ethnic, regional, racial or discrimination of any other form of division is punishable by law” (The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 2000). Practically this also includes political, professional, and ecclesiastic division. A law to this effect has been written into the new constitution. Thus, when it comes to asking people about their ethnicity, one must be careful not to be divisive.

One example of such conformity is highlighted by the national Rwandan agency LIPRODHOR (The Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights), which was closed for a time.²¹ This was the result of some of their members’ reporting that people in the agency had engaged in ethnically divisive activities, mainly through the political arena. Some, such as Joseph Bideri (8/3/06), director of the Governmental Information Agency for Radio and Television, said that this whistle-blowing was a good thing; others, such as Amnesty International (2005, January 10), decried it as destruction of accountability in Rwandan society. LIPRODHOR reopened a few months later and now functions normally, though without any political involvement outside of normal voting as the Rwandan constitution allows.

Such mixtures of ethnicity and politics have even been engaged in by former president Bizimungu, who was impeached and eventually jailed²² as a result of what he said to a French newspaper reporter, which described Rwandan and Burundian Armies as “100% Tutsis,” though 85% of the people in both of those countries are Hutu. He also said that if things continued this way, the Hutus would “kill . . . and chase out the Tutsis”

²¹ LIPRODHOR is Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l’Homme

²² The former president was pardoned on April 5th 2007, (allafrica.com, retrieved 7/15/07)

(Thorn, [n.d.], No. 2112). It was construed as divisive ideology for an acting president to make this type of genocidal threat toward roughly 14% of his own constituency.

The Rwandan government wants to be seen as honest and pursuing the population's best interests in every way. The French and the FDLR will do anything they can to sully that image. Bishop John Rucyahana said that "every time, France fights against Rwanda [in] April," which is during their genocide remembrance week, a time of national mourning (8/26/06). The trust of the populace was shaken through their experiences with Habyarimana's government's anti-Tutsi propaganda machine. Such a lack of trust makes life very difficult for the average citizen and makes the present government's challenge even greater as they try to rebuild the nation.

It has been a very difficult season for the Rwandan government as it has tried to assist people in reconciling. Because the land is so compact, many times the alleged participants in the genocide have to live next door to families whom they may have caused to suffer during the genocide. According to Andrew Rwigamba, the commissioner general for Rwanda, it is a plight even worse than that of the Jewish holocaust survivors: "People [in Rwanda] must live together . . . [the] Jews left Germany after the Holocaust . . . A solution must be found" (8/29/06). Justice and reconciliation will be discussed later in this section.

It is complicated to live with these tensions while considering how it affects actual families, especially when the ethnic line is rarely a black-or-white concept. One source said that few Rwandans could claim a "pure" ethnic descent. According to Elizabeth Neuffer (2001):

They [Neuffer’s interviewees whom she called “JJ” and “Anonciata”; they were from very different social backgrounds] considered themselves Rwandans first and foremost, and scoff at the idea of any real racial differences between them. Indeed contrary to what I believed, Hutu and Tutsi, by most anthropologists’ definitions are not different ethnic groups at all: they speak the same language, have the same religion, have intermarried, with as many as 25 percent of all Rwandans believed to have mixed ancestry. ‘I cannot say there are no Tutsi in my family, nor can any Hutu household. . . . [Anonciata said] No Hutu can say that they do not have Tutsi in them.’ (p. 86)

Regardless, the Belgian colonizers imposed the identity card system, which in many cases arbitrarily defined people as ethnically Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. They imposed guidelines of 85%, 14%, and 1% respectively to describe the number of individuals from the given ethnicities at any time.

One interviewee, Raymond Biseruka (7/31/06), came from the second marriage of a Hutu man to a Tutsi woman that functioned more like concubinage. When his father had taken a second wife, she was Tutsi, as most Hutu men saw Tutsis as more beautiful and exotic. Biseruka was given a Tutsi identity card, even though he was technically Hutu according to Rwandan tradition, in which ethnicity is passed through the father (thus *making* him a Hutu).²³ This identity card meant that he would never be able to pass exams that would allow him to move on to the next level of schooling. Children from such relationships have difficulty being accepted.

²³ i.e., if a person’s mother is Hutu and father is Tutsi, he is Tutsi, and if his mother is Tutsi and father is Hutu, he is Hutu.

When circumstances started to become violent, Biseruka wanted to join the RPF, but this would have been a death warrant to those who saw him as a Tutsi. To offset these issues, Raymond's brother, who also had a Tutsi identity card, joined the *Interahamwe* in order to protect his family. If he had not done this, his family would have been in even more danger. His brother's name was announced on the radio as a Tutsi who was working toward the *Interahamwe*'s genocidal goals. Raymond's brother "had to kill to the maximum" in order to prove himself.

Biseruka had to dodge bullets twice and was only saved because a man was willing to house him against the *Interahamwe*'s wishes. Even after the genocide, the difficulties continued. Returning refugees asked him continually why he had survived, because his survival implied his participation in the slaughter. He talked about how inter-ethnic families were without unity "even under one roof," that parents did not know how to help the children figure things out. He says that God has given him favor to speak into these families.

An interesting caveat to this story is Biseruka's recent marriage to a *Banyamelenge*—a Tutsi who lives in the DRC. He does not know of any other Tutsi who married someone who had a family member kill in the *Interahamwe*. He asked his future wife to tell her family about this. He wanted to give an opportunity for reconciliation before he was married.

A story is told all over the country to try to help the people understand how they need to respond to ethnic division. In Nyange in 1996, when there were still significant incursions into Rwanda by *Interahamwe* forces from the refugee camps in DRC, a group of secondary school girls were faced with the ubiquitous question "who are Hutus and

who are Tutsis?” as a group of 150 *Interahamwe* entered their rooms at night (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 353). This question might have been asked at any time in the educational process under Habyarimana’s reign, though with very different results. According to Leonard Bizimungu (8/22/06), a secondary school manager of the school in Nyange where these events occurred, these girls refused to separate into ethnic categories. They said simply, “We are Rwandan,” and as such, several were randomly executed and beaten.

According to many documents, the process of reconciling and realizing ethnicity in a non-divisive way will take a while. The sense of the author was that the country will be able to emerge out of the chaos of their past and become capable of dealing with their future as they can come together as one to face their challenges. All of these attempts to have the people become “Rwandan” as opposed to Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are in direct contrast to the previous government that masterminded the murder of an entire category of its own people in the name of ethno-nationalism.